















   
INTRODUCTION 
CHARTING THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER†
In the first three years of the Trump administration, the president 
nominated and the Senate confirmed 187 judges to Article III federal 
courts, including two Supreme Court Justices, 50 circuit court judges, 
133 district court judges, and two to the U.S. Court of International 
Trade.1 To put that number in perspective, there are 860 authorized 
Article III judgeships.2 So President Trump’s appointees account for 
roughly one-fifth of the entire Article III federal judiciary. Enormous 
resources have been dedicated to this process, including millions of 
dollars and thousands of hours by outside organizations like the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and other interest groups.3 
Yet this focus on Article III judges is myopic. The federal judiciary 
today expands far beyond Article III. And I am not referring to just 
the 50 or so Article I judges who populate the territorial courts, the 
Copyright © 2020 Christopher J. Walker.
† Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. This Essay builds 
on the Author’s introductory remarks at the Duke Law Journal’s 50th Annual Administrative 
Law Symposium: Charting the New Landscape of Administrative Adjudication. 
1. See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-every-
four-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/TP9D-JGK9]. See generally Judicial Appointment Tracker, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Judicial Appointment Tracker],
https://www.heritage.org/judicialtracker [https://perma.cc/T9GK-CPAW]. 
2. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS 8 (2018), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD3R-A55U]. 
3. See, e.g., Paul Kane, Senate Democrats Vastly Outspent by Right in Gorsuch Fight, WASH.
POST (Mar. 18, 2017, 3:57 PM), http://wapo.st/2n1dcrc?tid=ss_tw [https://perma.cc/JU7H-9A7M]
(reporting Republican Party estimates that $3.3 million were spent on ads to support the 
confirmation of now-Justice Gorsuch); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 1, 1–3 (2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Backgrounder.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/FXX6-NAW9] (detailing the ABA’s judicial-nominee evaluation process that has 
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Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.4 The 
overwhelming bulk of federal adjudication today takes place in federal 
agencies. There are more than 1900 administrative law judges 
(“ALJs”) in the federal administrative judiciary,5 plus more than 
10,000 non-ALJ agency adjudicators who conduct evidentiary hearings 
that are required by statute or regulation.6 And these adjudicators do 
not engage in the hundreds of thousands of less-formal adjudications 
in countless regulatory contexts, conducted by tens of thousands of 
other agency officials.7 
To provide just one point of comparison, through January 2020 
the Trump administration’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has hired 
more immigration judges (248) than the Senate has confirmed Article 
III judges (187)—in total, more than half of immigration judges 
nationwide (466).8 Yet there is no ABA committee that rates proposed 
immigration judges or other agency adjudicators. There are no 
television ads run. The Senate plays no role in their selection—though 
Congress of course retains its oversight and appropriations authority. 
The president also oversees administrative adjudications to some 
degree. Indeed, earlier this year, the Office of Management and 
Budget (“OMB”) announced an ambitious plan to reassess agency 
adjudications in order to ensure that they “operate subject to 
4. There are four Article I territorial judges and 16 judges on the Article I Court of Federal 
Claims. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2. And there are currently 19 Article I 
judgeships on the Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (2018), five Article I judgeships on the Court 
of Appeals for the Armed Forces, see 10 U.S.C. § 942(a) (2018), and between three and seven 
Article I judgeships on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, see 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2018). 
5. Administrative Law Judges, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (Mar. 2017),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency 
[https://perma.cc/98A2-SWGD].  
6. Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, 
Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1, 22 n.119, 32 (2019). 
7. See Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency Adjudication, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 2679, 2703 & n.166 (2019). 
8. Compare Itkowitz, supra note 1 (reporting that, as of December 19, 2019, 187 Trump-
appointed Article III judges had been confirmed), with EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION 
REVIEW,ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: IMMIGRATION JUDGE (IJ)HIRING (Jan. 2020) (noting 466 
total immigration judges as of January 2020, 92 of whom were hired in fiscal year (“FY”) 2019, 
while 28 were hired in the first quarter of FY2020), and Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
EOIR Announces Largest Ever Immigration Judge Investiture (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eoir-announces-largest-ever-immigration-judge-investiture [https://perma.cc/ 
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requirements that ensure they are fair, speedy, accurate, transparent, 
and respectful of the rights of Americans.”9 
This Charting the New Landscape of Administrative Adjudication 
Symposium, which commemorates the Duke Law Journal’s 50th 
annual administrative law symposium,10 thus arrives at a crucial time. 
Indeed, in many ways, the Symposium returns us to the beginning of 
the modern administrative state and the first years of the Duke Law 
Journal’s annual administrative law symposium. After all, the founders 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) of 1946 were primarily 
concerned with administrative adjudication.11 That continued to be the 
case for two decades after the APA’s enactment.12 Then, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, courts, scholars, and policymakers turned their attention to 
rulemaking—perhaps viewing it as a more democratic and legitimate 
mode of administration.13 Professors Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph 
O’Connell effectively illustrate this shift by looking at the evolution of 
administrative law casebooks: 
[A]s late as 1974, the Gellhorn and Byse casebook in the field devoted 
only twenty-two pages to rulemaking proceedings, which mostly was 
a lengthy excerpt from a single case limiting the use of formal 
rulemaking. By contrast, it devoted two chapters (281 pages) to 
adjudication. . . . Even more strikingly, the first edition of the Davis 
casebook in 1951 dedicated only three pages to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, though it gave a whole chapter to formal rulemaking, 
which uses essentially adjudicatory techniques.14 
In the past few years, however, administrative adjudication has 
begun to receive renewed attention—and scrutiny. The Supreme Court 
has recently considered constitutional questions regarding the 
appointment of ALJs15 and the limits of agency adjudication under 
9. Request for Information: Improving and/or Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and 
Adjudication, 85 Fed. Reg. 5482, 5483 (Jan. 30, 2020). 
10. For more on the 50-year history of the annual administrative law symposium, see 
Randolph J. May, Foreword: The Symposium at Fifty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1681 (2020). 
 11. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1575–77 (1996). 
 12. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 (2014). 
 13. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 456 (1986) 
(describing an emerging need for rulemaking to complement a spate of new statutes in the 1960s 
and 1970s). 
14. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1144.
 15. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (considering whether ALJs are “Officers” 
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Article III.16 In response to Lucia v. SEC,17 the president issued an 
executive order that radically alters the process for selecting and 
appointing ALJs,18 and DOJ has issued similar guidance to federal 
agencies.19 Several large-scale studies of agency adjudicators and 
adjudicative procedures have been published.20 These studies have 
greatly informed an increasingly robust debate about the current 
landscape and future of administrative adjudication. This debate has 
high stakes for matters of national concern, most notably in the areas 
of patent law and immigration. 
The contributions to this Symposium nicely capture and advance 
the debate. Professor Emily Bremer sets the stage by mapping out the 
great diversity of adjudicative systems in the modern regulatory state 
and arguing for more uniformity in those systems.21 The former 
observation has been an emerging theme in the literature. For instance, 
in 2016, the Administrative Conference of the United States 
recognized an important tripart categorization of agency adjudicative 
systems: Type A adjudication is the classic, formal adjudication 
prescribed by the APA and normally presided over by an ALJ; Type 
B adjudication is similarly formal but occurs outside of the APA’s 
formal-adjudication provisions, where non-ALJ agency adjudicators 
are required to hold a hearing by a statute, regulation, or executive 
order; and Type C adjudication is the residual category for less-formal 
adjudications where no evidentiary hearing is required.22 
In other words, the new landscape of administrative adjudication 
is yet another example of Farber and O’Connell’s “lost world of 
administrative law” in that “the actual workings of the administrative 
state have increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the 
16. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 
(2018). 
17. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
18. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018).
19. Memorandum from the Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Agency Gen. 
Counsels, Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) (July 2018). 
 20. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT (Admin. Conf. U.S. ed., 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-updated-draft-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JTH-J2VF]; Barnett & Weaver, supra note 6. 
21. Emily S. Bremer, Reckoning with Adjudication’s Exceptionalism Norm, 69 DUKE L.J. 
1749 (2020). 
22. Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016). The 
ABA adopted the same categorization a decade earlier. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 114 
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APA and classic judicial decisions that followed.”23 As Bremer 
underscores, however, it is not a new world just because the vast 
majority of adjudications take place outside of the formal provisions of 
the APA; there is also an APA-departing norm of “exceptionalism” in 
the new world of agency adjudication—“a presumption in favor of 
procedural specialization and against uniform, cross-cutting 
procedural requirements.”24 Bremer chronicles this new world of 
exceptionalism, ultimately concluding that administrative 
adjudications should be more uniform.25 Such a move toward 
uniformity—perhaps accomplished by creating a federal 
administrative adjudication “bill of rights” of sorts—would be, in my 
view, a welcome development. It would not at all surprise me if OMB’s 
current efforts to reform administrative adjudication moved in that 
direction and drew substantially from Bremer’s important contribution 
to this Symposium. 
Professor Kent Barnett’s contribution turns to the constitutional 
tensions in agency adjudication introduced by recent Supreme Court 
decisions.26 As Barnett explains, there is a tension between political 
control and independence: agency heads now have the ability to 
remove agency adjudicators essentially at will—thus risking the 
decisional independence and impartiality due process may require— 
and Congress lacks the authority to protect such agency adjudicators 
from at-will removal.27 Barnett proposes a novel solution to this 
constitutional quandary: drawing on principles of internal 
administrative law, he suggests that the executive branch should bind 
itself by promulgating impartiality regulations that reinstate a merit-
based appointment process as well as a good-cause removal standard 
and accompanying procedural protections from removal.28 
This is a fascinating proposal—one that merits consideration by 
OMB in its current efforts and by subsequent presidential 
administrations that may be even more interested in ensuring 
23. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 12, at 1140. Melissa Wasserman and I have compared 
and contrasted these lost and new worlds of agency adjudication in greater detail. See Christopher 
J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 
141, 148–57 (2019). 
 24. Bremer, supra note 21, at 1752. 
 25. Id. at Part III.
 26. Kent Barnett, Regulating Impartiality in Agency Adjudication, 69 DUKE L.J. 1695 (2020). 
 27. See id. at Part I (discussing, inter alia, Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2020); 
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)).  
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impartiality in agency adjudication. If the proposal sounds familiar, 
that is because it is modeled after DOJ’s special-counsel regulations 
that facilitated Robert Mueller’s high-profile investigation of the 2016 
presidential election.29 If Barnett’s approach is adopted, it will be 
interesting to see if litigants—or future administrations that may 
disagree with the impartiality regulations—raise constitutional 
concerns with the regulations or otherwise argue that the president 
nevertheless retains the constitutional authority to remove agency 
adjudicators at will.30 And it will be even more fascinating to see how 
the courts deal with such challenges. 
The final two contributions take an empirical turn. Professors 
Catherine Kim and Amy Semet explore the role of presidential 
ideology in immigration adjudication—one of the most prominent 
Type B adjudications in the new landscape of agency adjudication.31 
There is a rich empirical literature on immigration adjudication, which 
largely underscores the disparities in rulings among immigration judges 
and the importance of legal representation (or the lack thereof) in 
adjudicative outcomes.32 Using a dataset of more than 600,000 
 29. See id. at Part III.A.1 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2018)). 
 30. Compare Steven G. Calabresi, Mueller’s Investigation Crosses the Legal Line, WALL ST.
J. (May 13, 2018, 1:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/muellers-investigation-crosses-the-legal-
line-1526233750 [https://perma.cc/QK8W-2V8C] (“Mr. Mueller’s investigation has crossed a 
constitutional line, for reasons the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in the 1988 case Morrison v. 
Olson. . . . Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the court, while upholding the statute, 
set forth limits that the Mueller investigation has exceeded.”), with George Conway, The Terrible 
Arguments Against the Constitutionality of the Mueller Investigation, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018, 
5:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrible-arguments-against-constitutionality-mueller-
investigation [https://perma.cc/6UU4-7KUH] (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi because,
inter alia, “the special counsel regulations can be unilaterally revoked by the very executive 
branch that unilaterally created them”), and Josh Blackman, Can the Special Counsel Regulations 
Be Unilaterally Revoked?, LAWFARE (July 5, 2018, 7:22 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-
special-counsel-regulations-be-unilaterally-revoked [https://perma.cc/573V-F4F8] (“Conway is 
probably correct, but there is enough doubt on the point that courts could sufficiently impede the 
president’s rescission power to raise precisely the sort of separation-of-powers problem his piece 
argues does not exist.”). 
31. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, 69 
DUKE L.J. 1855 (2020). 
 32. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access To Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30–44 (2015) (finding disparities between judges in 
granting immigrants additional time to find counsel); David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration 
Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1213 (2016) (finding immigrants are treated unequally because 
immigration judges differ in how much help they provide immigrants in finding counsel); Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (noting that represented asylum seekers 
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individual custody decisions, Kim and Semet find that “on every metric 
of bond hearings, noncitizens fared worse during the Trump Era than 
they did during either the Bush II or Obama Eras.”33 These findings 
contribute greatly to an important inquiry into the role that 
presidential influence or political control plays in agency adjudication. 
This issue has taken on extra significance following the rise of political 
control of agency adjudication documented by Barnett in his 
Symposium article.34 
In their contribution to the Symposium, Professors Michael 
Frakes and Melissa Wasserman shed empirical light on trademark 
adjudication at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),35 a 
fitting complement to their previous pathbreaking empirical work on 
patent adjudication at the USPTO.36 In this study, they study decisions 
by trademark-examining attorneys, thus moving beyond Type A and 
Type B adjudication, and passing into the realm of Type C 
adjudication. And this is another high-volume adjudicative system. For 
instance, their dataset includes more than 7.8 million trademark 
applications adjudicated by more than 1300 trademark-examining 
attorneys from 1982 to the present.37 On a variety of measures, they 
find “substantial variation in outcomes across trademark-examining 
attorneys,” which “remains true even after accounting for a rich degree 
of application characteristics that may also impact these outcomes.”38 
Such disparities, they rightly point out, raise essential questions of 
fairness, equity, and social welfare—concerns shared throughout the 
new landscape of administrative adjudication. 
This Symposium charts much of the important terrain in the new 
landscape of administrative adjudication. Our federal judiciary today 
has moved far beyond Article III courts. We have also moved beyond 
the APA’s vision of the federal administrative judiciary, which consists 
of ALJs conducting hearings under the APA’s formal-adjudication 
provisions. Today, the vast majority of federal adjudications take place 
outside of Article III courts and APA formal adjudications. In 
33. Kim & Semet, supra note 31, at 1865. 
 34. See Barnett, supra note 26, at Part I. 
35. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Are There as Many Trademark Offices as 
Trademark Examiners?, 69 DUKE L.J. 1807 (2020). 
 36. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1601, 1601–02 (2016) (finding the year that a USPTO “examiner was hired has a lasting effect 
on her granting patterns over the course of her career”).
37. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 35, at Part III.A. 
 38. Id. at Part IV. 
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particular, more than 10,000 other agency adjudicators hold hearings 
to adjudicate hundreds of thousands of matters each year. And 
thousands more adjudicate matters without even a hearing. It is safe to 
conclude that this Symposium will not be the last word on the new 
landscape of administrative adjudication. But the contributions in this 
Symposium will no doubt help frame those debates and discussions for 
years to come. 
